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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

'

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership, and
DARRELL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

1

Case No, 880544-CA

Defendants and Respondents,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code
Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Humphries

adopts

the

nature

of

the

proceedings

as

stated by Wright.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is

Rule

34

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure clear and unambiguous concerning costs on appeal.
2.

Given the language of Rule 34 of Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure and this Court's prior decision, did

the trial court on remand have any discretion in awarding
costs on appeal,
3.

Did

refusing

the

trial

to modify

court

attorney's

abuse

its

discretion

in

fees awarded Humphries

at

trial?
4.

Is this appeal so frivolous that attorney's fees

should be awarded Humphries on this second appeal.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no Constitutional provisions at issue.

Rule

3 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is controlling
and is attached as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Humphries adopts Wright's Statement of the Case, but
adds the following clarifications:
1.

At the hearing on remand, Humphries' counsel took

the position that

(a) because costs were not awarded by

this Court and (b) Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure cannot be

construed

as awarding Wright costs,

there

to

an

was

no

need

Memorandum of Costs.

file

objection

to

Wright's

It was therefore improper for Wright

to seek costs based on a reading of this Court's decision
and Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2

2.

The trial court correctly followed the directive

of this Court and awarded Wright $8,152.50 for attorney's
fees incurred on appeal.
3.

Humphries'

counsel

also

suggested

(in

argument

that was not recorded by the court reporter) that:
A.

The jury had already reduced attorney's fees

based on the equities of this matter.

Such a decision

by the jury or the court is within the province of the
fact finder.
B.

Post-verdict

and while

the jury was

still

impaneled, Wright failed to make inquiry why the jury
reduced attorney's fees, or on what issue attorney's
fees

were

awarded.

Failure

to

make

that

inquiry

constitutes waiver.
C.

The

burden

was

on

Wright

to

prove

by

a

preponderance of the evidence why and how attorney's
fees

should

be

reduced.

There

was

conflicting

testimony at the remand hearing on the attorney's fees
incurred by Humphries for the issues Wright prevailed
on in his appeal.

Wright failed to meet his burden,

and the Court would not speculate in that area.
4.

The Court of Appeals' decision did not mandate a

reduction of attorney's fees.

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court found that Wright failed to meet his
burden on remand on the issue of a reduction in attorney's
fees

awarded

Humphries

at

trial.

The

speculate in that area. (T.24, 25).

court

refused

to

(See Order Assessing

Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal, Directing Disbursements
of Supersedeas Bond and Exonerating Preliminary Injunction,
Addendum B ) .
A trial court's finding of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, will not be set aside on appeal
unless

clearly

Blacker

Appl.

Western

Kane

erroneous.
and

Copper

State

Farn. Co., 770

County

Spec.

Servicer

P.2d

Leasing
88

(Utah

District

v.

Co.

v.

1988);
Jackson

Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1987); Porter v. Groover,
734 P.2d 434, 435 (Utah 1987).
A

trial court's

although

there

is

finding

evidence

is clearly erroneous when,
to

support

it,

the

court

reviewing all the record evidence is left with a definite
and

firm conviction

that a mistake has been made.

The

Appellate Court may regard a finding as clearly erroneous
only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support
or

induced

by

an

erroneous

view of the

law.

State v.

Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Western Capital v.
Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah 1989).
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In order to challenge a trial court's finding of fact,
an

appellant

must

first

marshal

all

the

evidence

that

supports the findings and then demonstrate that, despite
this evidence, they are so lacking
"against

the

clear

weight

clearly erroneous.
(Utah

1989).

prerequisite

the

evidence"

marshaling

the

Appellate

of

the

Court's

evidence

Koller,

758

thus,

P.2d

919

(Utah

is

determination

whether the findings are clearly erroneous.
v.

andf

In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885

This
to

of

in support as to be

1988);

a
of

Cornish Town
Fitzgerald

v.

Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Humphries submits that Wright has clearly failed to
meet the standard for review established by this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly interpreted Rule 34 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and this Court's decision
on the issue of costs.

The trial court had no discretion

to award costs.
The trial court properly

applied

its discretion

in

denying Wright's attempt to reduce attorney's fees awarded
Humphries at trial.
This appeal is so frivolous that Humprhies should be
awarded

attorney's

fees.

Alternatively,

5

Humphries

is

entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party if he
prevails on appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WRIGHT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO NOR WAS HE
AWARDED COSTS ON THE PRIOR APPEAL
In Appellant's Brief, Wright totally disregards
language

of

Procedure

and

Rule
the

34

of

holding

the

Utah

of

this

Rules
Court

of
on

the

Appellate
the

prior

appeal.
Rule 34(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure states
as follows:
To whom awarded., Except as otherwise provided by
lav;, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise
agreed by the peirties or ordered by the court; if
a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be
taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered;
if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall
be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not
be allowed
or
taxed
in a criminal
case.
(Emphasis added).
Applying the rule to the instant matter, we find that
the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
In that situation, costs are allowed only as ordered by the
court.

The Court of Appeals awarded no costs.

Rule 34 and

the decision by this Court could not be more clear.

6

Wright suggests that Humphries had an obligation to
object

to Wright's

bill

of

costs

and

failure

to do so

constitutes waiver.

That claim is best responded to by the

following question:

If Rule 34 is to the effect that in a

case which is affirmed in part and reversed in part, costs
are only awarded when specifically allowed by the court,
why

should

additional

a

litigant

attorney's

have

to

object

fees) when what

allowed in the first place?

(thus
is

incurring

sought

is not

To hold otherwise will cause

an objection to be made every time a party is not awarded
costs

but

still

seeks

them,

resulting

in

additional

pleadings, hearings before the court, and attorney's fees
to the client.

It will also cause the opposing party to

seek Rule 11 sanctions which may in fact be appropriate.
Wright also fails to recognize the underlying reason
why

Rule

34

is

written

as

it

is.

The

rule

recognizes that the when a case is affirmed

simply

in part or

reversed in part, the issue of costs is left for decision
by the Appellate Court.

Failure to award costs is a clear

indication by the court that it duly considered whether or
not costs should be awarded, and made a conscious decision
that neither party should be awarded costs.

Stated another

way, when a case is reversed and affirmed in part, both
parties prevailed on appeal and neither party
penalized by an award of costs.
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should be

POINT II
WRIGHT FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN AT THE REMAND
HEARING ON THE ATTORNEY'S FEES ISSUE
The

Appellate

Court

in

the

prior

appeal

correctly

recognized that Humphries was to be properly regarded as
the party who prevailed at trial and was thus entitled to
attorney's fees.
(Utah 1990) .

Wright v. Humphries, 787 P.2d

508, 517

However, this Court did not mandate that a

reduction of attorney's fees was required on remand, but
merely suggested that some adjustment may be necessary, Id.
at 517.
burden

This Court recognized that it would be Wright's
to persuade

the

trial

court

that

(1)

sufficient

proof existed in the; form of itemized billings or other
proof

that would

be

applicable

Humphries did not prevail; and

to

the

issues

on

which

(2) Wright would have to

overcome the legal consequences of (a) submitting the issue
of attorney's fees to the jury in the form of a general
verdict as to fees, emd (b) failing to make inquiry to the
jury

post-verdict

but

before

discharge,

on

what

issue

attorney's fees were awarded and how much.
Even

though

Humphries'

attorney

submitted

as

an

exhibit at the time of the original trial a copy of all
attorney's fees billed to Humphries, no attempt was made by
Wright at the remand hearing to show what work was done by

8

Humphries1

counsel

on

a

particular

day

which

was

attributable to a specific issue, (T. 15-20).
There was conflicting testimony at the remand hearing
on

the

issue

of

attorney

fees.

Humphries'

attorney

testified that because of the complexity of the litigation
and the numerous issues involved, it was impossible for him
to determine how much time he incurred on the fraud issue.
(T.18,

19).

defending
incurred.

The

the

time

issue

The

has

trial

Wright's
no

counsel

relevance

court

apparently

incurred

to what
weighed

in

Humphries
all

the

evidence presented and found that Wright had failed to meet
the burden of proof required.
This case was so complex and interwoven that it was
impossible to separate out attorney's fees incurred on a
specific matter.

The conflicting evidence at the remand

hearing, coupled with the trial court's recognition that
the jury had already reduced the attorney's fee sought by
Humphries from 30,000 to $10,000 was evidence enough to the
trial court that it should not speculate and merely guess
on an appropriate reduction of attorney's fees.

Since the

trial court would not speculate, this Court should avoid
the urge to do so.

As stated by the trial court at the

remand hearing:
The jury
that was
were not
why they

awarded $10,000 out of the 30,000 plus
requested by Mr. Chamberlain, and they
requested to give any explanation as to
reduced the requested attorney's fees.

9

I'm required under this decision to
determine whether or not the $10r000
award of attorney's fees ought to be
reduced further, in light of the fact
that Mr* Wright has prevailed on the
fraud claim, and that's been reversed
by the Court of Appeals—the jury's
finding on that has been reversed.
Since we can't guess why the jury found
the $10,000 fee in the first place, I'm
not going to guess on whether or not
that should be reduced. I don' t know
if there was any of that $10,0 00 that
was awarded on the fraud claim,.
As I said, I can say that if I were
making
the
determination,
the
attorney's fee would have been higher,
and it would have included, in all
likelihood,
some
fees
for
the
litigation on the fraud claim, which I
would have reduced now, in light of the
fact that the fraud claim has been
overturned.
But I can't assume that
the same procedure would be followed
with regard to the jury.
There fore,
I'm
going
to
allow
the
$10,000
attorney's fee to stand.
(T. 24, 25).
(Emphasis added).
The issue of attorney's fees incurred by Humphries has
been decided by both

the

jury and the trial court.

It

would be improper for this Court to substitute its judgment
for both of these fact finders who have heard the evidence
first hand.

POINT III
HUMPHRIES IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES ON THIS APPEAL
Wright's

appeal

on

both

issues

is

without

merit.

Humphries should therefore be awarded his attorney's fees
10

and costs on this second appeal.
continuation
appropriate

of
in

a
the

Since this case is a

case

where

attorney's

first

instance,

they

fees

are

likewise

appropriate now, but only if requested by a party.
has

not

requested

an

award

of

attorney's

were

fees

Wright
in

this

appeal and it would therefore be error for this Court to
award attorney's fees to Wright even if he prevails on this
appeal.

CONCLUSION
This Court should deny Wright's claim for costs.
Court

should

Court

substitute

determine

an

also

reject
its

Wright's

judgment

appropriate

for

reduction

suggestion

that

the

court

for

trial

attorney's

The
this
and
fees

awarded Humphries.
Neither
evidence

or

of Wright's
by

law.

arguments

Humphries

are

should

attorney's fees and costs on this appeal.

supported
be

by

the

awarded

his

It is important

to note that Wright has not requested attorney's fees on
this appeal.
DATED this

A^
;

day of August, 1990.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

Hans Q. Chamberlain
Attorney for Respondents
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*7(/fr\ day
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the
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and

foregoing

RESPONDENTS1

BRIEF

to

Gary

W.

Pendleton, Attorney for Appellant, at 150 North 200 East,
suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770.

Hans Q. Chamberlain
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ADDENDUM A

Rule 34/ Award of costs.
(a) T o w h o m allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appealis
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, casts
shall be taxed'against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgme'ntjor
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated,
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or
taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for a n d a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e of Utah- In cases involving the state
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against t h e
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or
prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs a n d a t t a c h m e n t s , r e c o r d , b o n d s a n d o t h e r exp e n s e s o n a p p e a l . The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees
for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of c o s t s t a x e d after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party
in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur
is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file
ivith the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The
Adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the clerk
of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party
gntitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice
and.hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment
frhichshall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force
and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of t h e
clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court upon the request of either party
made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment.
(e) Costs in o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s a n d a g e n c y a p p e a l s . In all other matters
before the court, including appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of t h e
time in which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after a n
brder denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to
have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within
ihe allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill,
the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle t h e
costs, tax the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against t h e
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by t h e
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of
judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the m a n n e r a n d
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur\ 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 1009 to 1024.

C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979.
Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 221 et seq.

ADDENDUM B

GARY W. PENDLETON USB #2564
Attorney for Plaintiff
150 North Second East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411

•DO

m\ ?.? nn 10 23
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1

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT,

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

;|

ORDER ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL,
DIRECTING DISBURSEMENTS OF
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND
EXONERATING PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BOND

])

WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah
limited partnership and
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an
individual,

])
]
)

Civil No. 85-0536

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on Plaintiff's motion to reduce the attorney's fees awarded to
Defendants at trial and to assess attorney's

fees reasonably

incurred on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff

appeared in person and by and through his attorney, Gary W.
Pendleton and Defendants appeared by and through their attorneyf
Hans Q. Chamberlain.

The Court having heard the statements of

counsel and having taken evidence regarding the issue of attorney's
fees and having reviewed the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals
and being fully advised in the premises entered the following
orders:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
attorney's fees awarded Defendants at trial are not reduced because
1

the jury was not requested to disclose the* basis of their award of
the attorney's fees and the Court is not going to speculate in that
area.
IT
Plaintiff

IS

FURTHER

recover

from

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

Defendant

the

sum

AND
of

DECREED

that

$8,152.50

as

reimbursement for attorney's fees reasonably incurred on appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court having found the same to be
reasonably and necessarily incurred.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff recover no costs on
appeal and his Bill of Costs filed on March 7,~ 1990, is hereby
stricken.

This order is made on the grounds and for the reasons

that the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeeils does not specifically
award Plaintiff costs on appeal and such costs are not recoverable
by application of Rule 34, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District
Court immediately disburse the funds now held as supersedeas bond
in the above-entitled matter from which the sum of $26,314.72 shall
be

paid

over

to

the

Defendants

and

their

attorney,

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain, and the balance of which shall be paid over to the
Plaintiff and his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton.
The amount due Defendants is calculated by beginning with
the $20,198.21 awarded to Defendants as reimbursement

for that

portion of the $30,000.00 loan which made its way into the Westside
Nursery Account and was used to pay obligations for which Plaintiff
was ultimately responsible,

To that sum is added the attorney's

fees awarded Defendants at trial.
2

From this sum is subtracted the attorney's fees Plaintiff
incurred on appeal.
Post Judgment interest (589 days at 12% per annum) is
added to the adjusted award.
Expressed mathematically:
Items awarded Defendants:
Reimbursement

$20,198 . 21

Attorney's Fees awarded Defendants
(not modified)

10,000.00

TOTAL AWARD

$30,198.21

Adjustments:
Costs on appeal (none awarded)

-0-

Attorney's Fees awarded Plaintiff
on appeal

$8,152.50

TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS

-8,152.50

ADJUSTED AWARD

$22,045.71

Post Judgment Interest
TOTAL DISBURSEMENT TO DEFENDANT

$4,269.01
$26,314.72

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon
disbursement of the supersedeas bond as more specifically set forth
above, all monetary judgments entered by this Court in the aboveentitled action shall be fully satisfied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
preliminary injunction bond in the amount of $50,000.00 posted by

3

the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action is hereby exonerated and
the surety is discharged.

DATED t h i s

J

a^~~day

ofjtfarch,

1990.

J . I f h i l i p Evej
D i s t r i c t Judge

i

^ p p x o v e a as t o n form and ccThtent:
. ,V-A^
Hans' Q. Chamberlain
.{
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